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INTRODUCTION
There is no dispute that the district court concluded there were two distinct
Terry stops here. Without analysis, the State simply claims that any issue is
foreclosed by this Court’s ruling in United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776 (4th
Cir. 2004), and attempts to distinguish other precedent based solely on the amount
of time between stops. Neither argument disposes of the issues in this case. In
Foreman, the Court did not analyze the issue of a subsequent stop in light of the
nature of subsequent stops, but rather treated it as a fluid situation. And
distinctions based on time between stops are distinctions without a difference.
Allowing law enforcement to repeatedly stop citizens without new, articulable
suspicion amounts to unjust harassment regardless of the amount of time that
lapses between stops, and the State cites no case that has ruled law enforcement
may continue to stop citizens over and over again so long as they do not allow
much time to lapse between stops.
In any event, even if the stops are merged into one, expanding the scope of
the search violated William’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure. As a matter of law, the indicia relied on by the State do not raise
reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity, and further detention to support a
drug dog sweep was unwarranted. The Court should vacate Williams’ conviction
with directions to grant the motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WERE TWO DISTINCT DETENTIONS WITHOUT ANY
ADDITIONAL SUSPICION JUSTIFYING THE SECOND
DETENTION
The State does not dispute that there were two, independent stops in this

case. And it offers no analysis of the legal ramifications of stopping a citizen,
letting him go, and then stopping him a second time. In the opening brief,
Williams established that there is a line of authority in other circuits establishing
that once a stop ends, there cannot be another stop without new, articulable basis
for reasonable suspicion independent from the prior stop. AOB 12-17 (discussing
United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517 (10th Cir. 1993), United States v. Garcia, 23
F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (8th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 769
(5th Cir. 1982). The State did not directly address any of the analysis giving rise to
this principle of search and seizure law.
The State relies exclusively on one distinguishable case that also does not
directly analyze the second stop issue. The State argues that in United States v.
Foreman, the Fourth Circuit rejected any analysis requiring new articulable
suspicion to justify a new Terry stop following a stop that has concluded. AB 8.
But in that case, the officer gained a new fact supporting reasonable suspicion as
he concluded the initial Terry stop. See Foreman, 369 F.3d at 779. This Court
noted “[the officer] returned [the defendant’s] driver’s license and registration,
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after which [the defendant] thanked [the officer] for the warnings and gave him a
sweaty handshake.” Id. The Court relied on “heavy sweating,” a “physical sign[]
of nervousness” to support its holding that reasonable suspicion existed. Id. at 784.
According to the facts relayed, the officer did not make physical contact
with the defendant and observe the defendant’s sweaty palms until after the officer
had issued the warning ticket. Thus the officer gained additional information after
issuing the ticket. Here, on the other hand, the officers gained no new information
supporting reasonable suspicion before the first stop concluded—all of the State’s
purported justifications for the second detention were known before the stop
terminated.
Moreover, that decision did not consider precedent on the issue of sequential
Terry stops because “[t]he district court did not cite any case law supporting the
proposition that it was required to ignore all of the events which occurred before
the time [the officer] ostensibly allowed [the defendant] to leave. [And the Court
was] aware of none.” Instead, it treated the situation as fluid and looked to United
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001). But in that case, unlike
here, the court never found there were two distinct stops and thus the relevant
issues also were never addressed. If two stops had been found, the court would
have been bound by Peters, 10 F.3d at 1522-23.
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The State did not advance any argument supporting an officer’s authority to
initiate a Terry stop after terminating a previous stop without any new evidence.
Its only argument to distinguish prior case law is that, in the cases cited by
Williams, the second stops were separated from the first by greater distances and
amounts of time. But the State does not explain why an individual’s liberty
interest is decreased immediately following a Terry stop or why it would replenish
as the individual moves away from the stop. And not Peters, nor Garcia, nor
Morin suggests that there was a gradually-replenishing liberty interest. To the
contrary, once an individual is free to go his or her liberty interest exists in full.
The State’s offered distinctions are not legally significant.
II.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF EVEN A SINGLE DETENTION
“[W]hen an officer seeks to expand [an] investigation of a motorist beyond

the reasons for the [initial stop], the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that
the particular person seized in engaged in criminal activity.” United States v.
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2007). To support the expansion here, the
State points to only four facts that, it argues, allow a routine traffic stop to
transform into a drug investigation: (1) Williams was driving on Interstate 85 (2)
early in the morning, (3) he provided a P.O. Box to the detaining officers rather
than his home address, and (4) his vehicle’s rental agreement expired before he
planned to leave his stated destination. AB 12-13. Collectively, these facts are
-4-

wholly consistent with lawful activity and do not eliminate a substantial portion of
innocent travelers. The State does not address the cases Williams raised in his
opening brief at 17-20. Rather, it cites additional cases to argue individual facts
here are similar to facts that supported reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of
other detentions. AB 12-13. The State’s cases are highly distinguishable, though,
and the closest analogs—cited by Williams and not rebutted—plainly establish that
there was not enough evidence to form reasonable suspicion to change the scope of
the seizure.
In its first case, United States v. $50,720.00 in U.S. Currency, 589 F. Supp.
2d 582 (E.D.N.C. 2008), in addition to travel on a drug corridor, the State founded
its case on an “overwhelming odor of air freshener, the presence of two cellular
telephones in the center console and [defendant’s] nervousness.” Id. at 583. These
unique drug-specific facts went beyond merely traveling on an interstate, and go
well beyond the facts in this case to amount to reasonable suspicion. Likewise, in
United States v. Newland, 246 F. App’x 180 (4th Cir. 2007), the State offered
eleven factors leading to reasonable suspicion and especially focused on the fact
that the officer could suspect defendants were making a common drug run by
flying to Miami and driving to New York, the defendants apparently exited the
highway to avoid a checkpoint, and defendants told an apparently false story about
why they exited the highway. Id. at 358 n.4. Finally, the defendant in United
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States v. Brugal, was “uncontrollably” nervous, told apparently false and/or
inconsistent stories about his address and the address on his rental agreement, and
he also provided an apparently fake ID. 209 F.3d at 182-83.
Each of the State’s cases contains one fact similar to a fact here, but each
case also contains additional facts not present here that, taken as a whole, led to
articulable reasonable suspicion. The purely innocuous facts in this case, when
taken as a whole, continue to be innocuous. Because the facts do not lead to
reasonable suspicion, it was impermissible to expand the scope of the traffic stop
and turn it into a drug investigation.
III.

NO “DE MINIMIS INTRUSION” STANDARD APPLIES HERE
The State argues that any intrusion here was “de minimis” and should be

excused on that ground. But the State does not and cannot address recent Fourth
Circuit law—cited in Williams’ AOB at 22—that rejects any time-based de
minimis exception to the rule that “where the traffic stop has concluded . . . any
subsequent detention is impermissible without the presence of reasonable
suspicion.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2011) (a rule
that grants an officer a specific amount of time “to do as he pleases [must be
rejected because it] reduces the duration component to a bright-line rule and
eliminates the scope inquiry altogether”). And in the context of second-stop
analysis, of course there is no de minimis exception to initiating a Terry stop
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without any reasonable suspicion to support it. See United States v. Garcia, 23
F.3d at 1334 (not discussing non-consensual duration of second detention, “six or
seven” minutes, and holding stop unlawful).
The State’s cited authority does not establish otherwise. The State relies on
dicta from a case predating this Circuits’ holding in Digiovanni that is highly
distinguishable. AB 16. The State relies on United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210
(4th Cir. 2008), to say “[t]he Fourth Circuit has specifically held that detaining a
defendant up to two minutes after the conclusion of a traffic stop to facilitate a
drug-dog sniff is a de minimis intrusion of an individual’s liberty interest.” Id. But
in Farrior, there was no intrusion on the individual’s liberty interest because the
individual had already consented to continued detention including to the search of
his vehicle at the time a drug dog was deployed. 535 F.3d at 219.
Indeed, the State’s own authority recognizes there is no de minimis
exception to the scope limitation in this Court. The Court recognized in Foreman
that “in order to perform [a drug-dog] sniff, there must be a seizure of the vehicle
and, therefore, the person, requiring either consent to be detained or reasonable
suspicion.” 369 F.3d at 781. Thus Farrior cannot stand for the proposition
asserted, and the Court’s authority rejects any bright-line rule that would allow an
investigation of unlimited scope for an allegedly “de minimis” period of time.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Charles Williams, Jr. respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence and reverse the district
court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
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